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ABSTRACT
Online social network (OSN) users upload millions of pieces
of content to share with others every day. While a signiﬁcant
portion of this content is benign (and is typically shared with
all friends or all OSN users), there are certain pieces of con-
tent that are highly privacy sensitive. Sharing such sensitive
content raises signiﬁcant privacy concerns for users, and it
becomes important for the user to protect this content from
being exposed to the wrong audience. Today, most OSN
services provide ﬁne-grained mechanisms for specifying so-
cial access control lists (social ACLs, or SACLs), allowing
users to restrict their sensitive content to a select subset of
their friends. However, it remains unclear how these SACL
mechanisms are used today. To design better privacy man-
agement tools for users, we need to ﬁrst understand the us-
age and complexity of SACLs speciﬁed by users.
In this paper, we present the ﬁrst large-scale study of ﬁne-
grained privacy preferences of over 1,000 users on Facebook,
providing us with the ﬁrst ground-truth information on how
users specify SACLs on a social networking service. Overall,
we ﬁnd that a surprisingly large fraction (17.6%) of content
is shared with SACLs. However, we also ﬁnd that the SACL
membership shows little correlation with either proﬁle in-
formation or social network links; as a result, it is diﬃcult
to predict the subset of a user’s friends likely to appear in
a SACL. On the ﬂip side, we ﬁnd that SACLs are often re-
used, suggesting that simply making recent SACLs available
to users is likely to signiﬁcantly reduce the burden of privacy
management on users.
1. INTRODUCTION
Online social networks (OSNs) are now a popular way for in-
dividuals to connect, communicate, and share content; many
of them now serve as the de-facto Internet portal for millions
of users. On these sites, users are encouraged to establish
friendships and upload content, providing an incentive for
users to return. As a result, social network users today have
hundreds of friends and many thousands of pieces of con-
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tent. These same users are also expected to manage their
privacy—i.e., select the appropriate privacy setting for each
piece of content—a task that is both time-consuming and
complex [34].
While much OSN content is shared with default settings
(e.g., visible to all of a user’s friends), certain sensitive con-
tent is often shared with subsets of friends. For example, on
Facebook, users may explicitly enumerate friends to allow
or deny the ability to view a photo, or create friendlists for
the same purpose. We refer to these resulting sets of users
who are able to access content as social access control lists
(social ACLs, or SACLs); by deﬁnition, a SACL is a proper
subset of a user’s friends who are selected by the user to ac-
cess a piece of content. Due to the privacy-sensitive nature
of the content the SACLs protect, one of the hardest parts
of using today’s OSN privacy management tools is deﬁning
appropriate SACLs for diﬀerent pieces of content.
Many prior studies have examined the privacy concerns
that arise when users share content on Facebook, such as the
problem of“over-sharing”content with default settings that
make the content visible to everyone in the network [34]. As
a solution, researchers have proposed grouping friends into
subgroups based on their relationship type (e.g., high school
friends, work colleagues, family) or community structure in
the one-hop network of the user, and sharing content with
speciﬁc subgroups [16]. However, most of these approaches
rely on small scale user studies where they conduct a survey
to understand the privacy preferences of users to evaluate
their technique. None of these approaches have been evalu-
ated on how well they capture real privacy preferences speci-
ﬁed using SACLs. Given that content shared with SACLs is
likely to be the most privacy sensitive (and therefore, likely
the most important), having an understanding of the SACLs
in-use is crucial to designing improved privacy mechanisms
for OSN users.
In this paper, we make three contributions: First, we con-
duct the ﬁrst large-scale measurement study of use of SACLs
in OSNs. Using a popular Facebook application installed by
over 1,000 users, we collect a total of 7,602 unique SACLs
speciﬁed by users.
1 We ﬁnd that over 67% of users are shar-
ing at least some of their uploaded content using SACLs,
and that 17.6% of all content is shared with a SACL; these
observations underscore the important and unstudied role
that SACLs play in users’ privacy management.
Second, we focus on understanding the membership of
SACLs (i.e., how are the friends who are allowed to view
1Our study was conducted under Northeastern University
Institutional Review Board protocol #14-01-09.
1a piece of content similar to each other, but diﬀerent from
other friends?). Examining the in-use SACLs that we col-
lected, we ﬁnd that for less than 10% of SACLs all the mem-
bers of the SACL share a common proﬁle attribute. More-
over, we ﬁnd that only 20% of SACLs show strong commu-
nity structure in the links between their members. Taken
together, these results suggest that SACLs are likely to be
diﬃcult to detect automatically. This result is surprising
given the existing work on automatically grouping friends
based on network structure or attributes for better privacy
management [16,39]; We suspect that this diﬀerence occurs
because these prior studies did not evaluate their techniques
against ground-truth data about ﬁne-grained content shar-
ing in OSNs.
Third, we explore the diﬃculty faced by users in specifying
SACLs today. Overall, we ﬁnd that the complexity of SACLs
(as deﬁned by the number of terms
2 a user must select when
creating a SACL) is quite high for a non negligible fraction
of our users: over 18% of users specify more than 5 terms
per SACL on average. We observe that there is signiﬁcant
room for improvement in reducing the burden of specifying
SACLs, and we ﬁnd that simply allowing users to re-use
previously used SACLs reduces much of the user overhead:
for the vast majority (> 80%) of users, 90% of their content
is shared with fewer than 5 unique SACLs.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 presents background and related work on SACLs and
OSN privacy. Section 3 describes how we obtained our SACL
data set, and Section 4 provides some high-level statistics on
SACLs. Section 5 explores the relationship between SACL
members, while Section 6 investigates the user overhead in
specifying SACLs today. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
In this section, we ﬁrst provide some background on how so-
cial networking sites have evolved in helping users to manage
their data privacy today. Our focus is on the ﬁne-grained
privacy management tools that enable the sharing of privacy
sensitive content on OSNs.
In this paper, we focus on the largest social networking
site as of March 2014 — Facebook. Up until 2005, Face-
book split users on the site into diﬀerent regional networks
(based on geography, workplace or educational institution).
By default, each user would share all of her content with
everyone in the regional network and the service lacked any
concrete privacy controls for sensitive data. By 2009, Face-
book had 300 million [15] users and some regional networks
grew too large (e.g., in India and China) to be used for pri-
vacy settings. There were widespread demands for better
privacy management mechanisms for users [7], and by the
end of 2009, Facebook rolled out more ﬁne-grained privacy
controls.
2.1 Mechanisms for privacy management
In December 2009, Facebook made an important change
which allowed users to set access control policies for content
they publish on a per-post basis [23]. For example, a user can
share a particular photo with only family members and close
friends. This change allowed users to customize their privacy
2When creating a SACL, a user can specify either individual
friends or pre-created lists of friends; we refer to both of
these as terms.
settings on a per-content basis, instead of simply adopting
the default privacy setting oﬀered by Facebook, which allows
access to “everyone” (all users on Facebook) [19].
Facebook introduced an additional mechanism called
friend lists [26] to complement their existing ﬁne-grained
privacy controls. Users can create friend lists and add a sub-
set of their friends to each of these lists. For example, a user
can create a list called “co-workers”and manually add all of
her friends who are co-workers into that list. This allows the
user to group her friends into diﬀerent lists that might be
meaningful to her in terms of sharing content. Now, instead
of handpicking individual friends for specifying a privacy set-
ting for each content, users can use their pre-created friend
lists for specifying privacy settings (e.g., share this photo
with “soccer buddies” list). Friend lists are private to the
user who creates them.
By October 2010, Facebook observed that only a small
percentage (5%) of Facebook users had ever created friend
lists [27]. This could be due to the manual eﬀort required of
the users to create and maintain friend lists. To help users
further, Facebook started automatically creating friend lists
for the user and populated the lists with a speciﬁc subset
of the user’s friends [14]; these lists are called smart lists.
This automation is done by leveraging the proﬁle attributes
of the user and the user’s friends, e.g., employer, location,
family and education information provided by users. An
example would be a list called “Family” that automatically
groups all the friends of the user who have marked the user
as a family member. In addition, Facebook also creates two
empty smart lists for the user,“Close Friends”and“Acquain-
tances”. However, instead of auto-populating these two lists,
Facebook only shows friend recommendations to the users
based on the interaction between the user and her friends.
In this paper, we will refer to all of these Facebook-created
smart lists as Facebook lists. Moreover, when using the term
lists we are referring to both the user-created friend lists as
well as Facebook lists.
So far, we observed that there are diﬀerent ways in which
a user can specify which friends have access to a piece of
content on Facebook today. In the rest of the paper, we
will use the term social access control lists (social ACLs or
SACLs) to refer to such privacy policy speciﬁcations. A
more precise deﬁnition is below.
Social access control lists (SACLs): A SACL is a pri-
vacy policy speciﬁcation attached to a piece of content con-
taining a proper subset of the user’s friends; friends speciﬁed
in the SACL have access to view and perform other actions
on the content (e.g, liking or commenting). SACLs can be
speciﬁed using diﬀerent mechanisms provided by Facebook:
allowing or denying access to individual friends one by one,
specifying friend lists, using Facebook lists, or using a com-
bination of handpicked friends and lists.
3
It is important to note that SACLs only encompass cus-
tom settings by users and do not include the Facebook pre-
deﬁned access permissions: “everyone” or “public” (share
with all Facebook users), “regional network” (share with
3Facebook also allows users who are tagged in a speciﬁc post
to see the content [22, 24]. However, since users did not
specify tagged friends explicitly through the privacy man-
agement interface, we do not consider them to be the part
of SACLs. We leave exploring privacy expressed through
tags to future work.
2everyone in a regional network, deprecated in 2009), “all
friends-of-friends” (share with all friends-of-friends), “all
friends” (share with all friends), and “only me” (only visi-
ble to the user who uploaded the content).
2.2 Related work
Now that we understand the background of this paper, we
discuss related work along three directions.
Understanding privacy awareness of users Researchers
have studied the privacy awareness of social networking
users [11, 30, 46]. These studies examine the proﬁle in-
formation sharing behavior of users over a long period of
time (e.g., 7 years) to understand if users’ attitude towards
their data privacy changes over time. Dey et al. [11] and
Stutzman et al. [46] have shown quantitative evidence that
Facebook users are sharing fewer proﬁle attributes (such
as hometown, birthdate and contact information) publicly
over time. Social media discussions about Facebook pri-
vacy [8,13,44,45,47] and Facebook regularly rolling out new
ﬁne grained privacy management features [21] for the last
few years have caught users’ attention and potentially in-
creased their concerns about available privacy controls.
How eﬀective are users in managing their privacy
settings? Recent studies have explored how eﬀective
users are in managing their privacy settings. Studies have
shown that there exists a mismatch between desired and
actual privacy settings when users share content on Face-
book [4,5,29,34,36]. Liu et al. [34] conducted a user survey
about privacy preferences for photos uploaded by users on
Facebook. They found that privacy settings match users’
expectations only 37% of the time, and when wrong, users
are exposing their content to a much wider audience (e.g.,
all friends, friends-of-friends or even everyone on Facebook)
than they intended. While the exact reason for incorrect
privacy settings is hard to infer, it could be due to poor
privacy management user interfaces or the signiﬁcant cog-
nitive burden required to manage privacy of their sensitive
content.
Techniques for better privacy management Several
techniques have been proposed to reduce the burden on
users when managing their privacy settings. We can or-
ganize work in this space into two high level categories: (1)
The ﬁrst approach is to assist in automatically pre-deﬁning
grouping of friends that might be meaningful to the user for
sharing sensitive content later. Facebook allows the user to
pre-deﬁne such friend groupings using the friend list feature.
But friend lists on Facebook have to be manually speciﬁed
by the user today and this user overhead could be reduced
by these approaches. (2) The second approach is to help
the user on the ﬂy to specify SACLs while sharing content.
They predict SACL speciﬁcations with some input from the
user. For example, if the user gives the name of a few friends
that he wants to share content with, these approaches can
automatically predict the remaining members of the SACL
or provide recommendations of other possible SACL mem-
bers. Now we will explain diﬀerent proposals that fall in the
above two categories.
PViz [39] is a proposal from ﬁrst category that can auto-
matically detect friend lists for a Facebook user and use it
for better privacy policy visualization for the user. It lever-
ages the network structure of the subgraph induced by the
user’s friends (i.e., the user’s “one-hop subgraph”) to detect
friend lists using a modularity-based community detection
algorithm. Using information extracted from friends’ pro-
ﬁle, it can also automatically assign a label to each detected
list. This helps the user to understand the composition of a
list. Based on these predeﬁned lists, PViz points out to users
which of her friends from a list can view a particular con-
tent. PViz presents a user study based on 20 users, who ﬁnd
PViz useful for understanding their existing privacy settings
better.
However, many previous works [1,16,48] fall in the sec-
ond category. They focus on recommending friends on the
ﬂy to the users as the user starts sharing a piece of con-
tent and selects a few intended friends. Privacy Wizard [16]
is one example of such a tool. Privacy Wizard leverages
network structure and proﬁle attributes (like gender, age,
education, work, etc) to recommend friends for inclusion in
a privacy setting. The process starts as the user tags a few
of her friends as “allowed” or “denied”for a content. It then
uses a machine learning algorithm to classify the remaining
untagged friends into an allow or denied category. The au-
thors designed a survey experiment with 45 Facebook users
and 64 proﬁle data items to evaluate the accuracy of their
tool. They observed that on average if a user tags 25 of her
friends, the wizard conﬁgures her privacy setting with high
accuracy. However in their experiments they did not look
into the ground truth data on how a user actually speciﬁes
SACLs while sharing sensitive content.
We conduct a large scale study comprising of 1,165 users
and all their uploaded content to focus on the privacy set-
tings used by users. Most prior work tries to approximate
ground truth privacy preference data by asking user pri-
vacy preferences explicitly, most of the time via surveys or
via a combination of surveys and proﬁle data collection us-
ing apps [30]. However, none of these studies looked into
the “ground truth” data on SACLs (i.e., how a normal user
would share their content using SACLs without any exter-
nal intervention). To the best of our knowledge, we are the
ﬁrst ones to look into ground-truth data on users’ usage of
SACLs to propose insights on how to assist users to reduce
the overhead of specifying SACLs.
2.3 Key questions
While ﬁne-grained privacy controls put users in better con-
trol of their data privacy, it is not clear how users are using
these privacy mechanisms. In this work, we take a ﬁrst look
at SACLs speciﬁed by 790 Facebook users (users who created
at least one SACL) for 212,753 pieces of uploaded content.
Our analysis focuses on the following key questions:
• How are users using SACLs today? We analyze how
often SACLs are speciﬁed by users and how diﬀerent
types of content are shared using SACLs.
• Is SACL membership predictable? We analyze charac-
teristics of SACL members to understand if they have
something in common that other friends of the user
do not. Our analysis explores whether members have
similar proﬁle attributes, exhibit strong social network
connectivity with each other, or share similar activity
levels. If we are able to separate out SACL members
from among all friends, we may be able to automati-
cally create SACLs for users.
• What is the user overhead in specifying SACLs? We
3examine the overhead that users spend specifying
SACLs today. The intuition is that, the more work
required to create SACLs, the less usable the privacy
mechanisms are.
• What is the potential for reducing user overhead?
Based on our insights gained from analyzing SACL
membership, we quantify the potential for further re-
ducing the complexity of SACL speciﬁcations. Our
ﬁndings serve as guidelines for designing better pri-
vacy management tools in the future.
3. DATASET
Now we describe the dataset we have collected about in-use
SACLs on OSNs today.
3.1 Collecting data about SACLs in Facebook
Obtaining data at scale about user privacy speciﬁcations is
quite challenging. In Section 2.2, we observed that most pre-
vious work used small-scale data about user privacy prefer-
ences. There are two main challenges in collecting large-scale
data: First, we need permission to view the user SACLs.
This is challenging as private settings on Facebook are pri-
vate to the user; they cannot be obtained by crawling pub-
licly visible user proﬁles. To address this challenge, we use
the Facebook API [17], which oﬀers methods to collect data
about in-use privacy settings (provided the user gives us per-
mission to do so). We therefore developed a Facebook appli-
cation that helps users to better manage their privacy set-
tings, and recruited users for the application. The Facebook
application requests consent from the user to collect data
about their SACL speciﬁcations for our research study. The
data collection was performed under an approved Northeast-
ern University Institutional Review Board protocol.
The second challenge is recruiting large number of users
for the study who can provide consent to access their private
SACL information. The traditional approach for recruiting
users rely on personal communication (e.g., via email) or
through an open call posted on a public bulletin board at
a university or research lab. In such cases, the number of
users that could potentially be recruited is usually limited
to a few tens or hundreds. Another approach is to use on-
line crowdsourcing platforms like Amazon Mechanical Turk
(AMT) [38]. However, using a Facebook application vio-
lates the AMT policy that workers should not be required
to download and install an application [2].
4 Instead, to re-
cruit a variety of users at scale, we leverage the Facebook
advertising platform.
3.1.1 Facebook Application: Friendlist Manager
We developed the Facebook app “Friendlist Manager” (or
FLM) [25,35] that helps the user to automatically create and
update friend lists that could be used for specifying SACLs.
This application reduces the user burden of manually creat-
ing friend lists. FLM automates list creation by leveraging
the network structure in the“one-hop subgraph”of the user.
It uses network community detection algorithms [6, 40] to
ﬁnd overlapping communities in the one-hop subgraph. We
found that users found FLM to be helpful; 480 (41%) of
our users allowed FLM to update at least one of their lists.
4Our data collection methodology requires users to install a
Facebook application.
It is important to note that for the analysis in this paper,
we only consider the content users shared and members of
friend lists users had before installing FLM; this ensures that
usage of our app does not impact the results.
When installing FLM, we request permission to access the
following types of user data: basic user proﬁle details includ-
ing workplace, education, current city and family; privacy
settings (including SACLs) used for all uploaded content
(photos, videos, statuses, notes, music, questions, Shock-
wave Flash Player (SWF) movies, and checkins); and the
friends, friend lists, and Facebook lists of the user. Should
the user choose to not grant us access to their content, they
are still allowed to use the application.
3.1.2 Recruiting users
To recruit users, we set up an advertisement for FLM on
the Facebook advertising platform. The Facebook adver-
tising platform allows us to reach out to the large Facebook
population and target users with speciﬁc demographics. Our
ad included the following text:
Need help to better organize your list of friends?
Give FLM a try!
Starting from June 20th 2012, we ran ﬁve ad campaigns
for 10 days targeting 10 countries where English is an oﬃ-
cial language: USA, UK, Australia, New Zealand, Canada,
India, Pakistan, Singapore, South Africa, and Philippines.
In total, 232 users installed our app during this period. Af-
ter this initial push, our app received a steady stream of
new users through August 2013; in total, we observed 1,007
additional users after the advertising campaign ended. We
believe FLM also spread“virally”, with users“liking”or rec-
ommending the app to their friends. While it is hard to
trace the source of these new 1,007 users, we found that 59
of them were friends of users who installed FLM through
ads. The remaining users likely found FLM through search
tools (e.g., Google Search) or through word-of-mouth based
propagation.
Overall, a total of 1,239 users installed our application.
For the purpose of this study, we only focus on the 1,165
users (94%) who gave us permission to access all the data
we required for our research study.
3.1.3 User bias
One potential issue with user studies is a bias in the user
population. In our case, it is challenging to obtain a ran-
dom set of Facebook users. This is a fundamental issue with
most user studies, and the common methodology is to care-
fully characterize the users under study to understand how
diverse the users are in terms of demographics. Our user
population is by no means random, and we report the de-
mographics and behavior of users below. We believe that
the users who installed FLM are those who are interested in
creating friend lists to better manage their privacy settings.
It is known that Facebook has been promoting friend lists
as a way to more eﬃciently specify privacy preferences [14].
Thus, our user sample is most likely biased towards privacy-
aware Facebook users. Additionally, ads can only be shown
to users when they are logged in to Facebook; we are there-
fore likely to get users who are active on Facebook.
3.1.4 Ethical Considerations
The data we collected in FLM is highly privacy sensitive,
and we took great care to respect users’ privacy. First, we
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Figure 1: (a) Cumulative distribution of number of pieces of content uploaded by users using SACLs. A
signiﬁcant fraction (67.8%) of users in our dataset upload at least one content using SACLs. (b) Cumulative
distribution of percentage of content per user shared using SACLs. More than 200 users in our dataset
uploaded more than 30% of their content using SACLs. (c) Cumulative distribution of number of unique
SACLs speciﬁed by each user who upload at least one content using SACLs.
conducted our study under Institutional Review Board ap-
proval. Second, we only report aggregate statistics here, and
in any future papers. Third, we will never release any non-
aggregated data to third parties. All of these steps were also
included as part of FLM’s Privacy Policy (provided to users
when installing FLM).
3.2 FLM user demographics
We now examine the demographics of users who installed
FLM and allowed us to collect their data. Users usually
self-report their location, age, gender and education on their
proﬁle. We examine the“current location” attribute to esti-
mate the location of users at a country level and ﬁnd that 952
(82%) users have provided location information. Accord-
ing to this information, users are from 75 countries covering
six continents. There were 19.2% users from North Amer-
ica, 18.1% from Europe and 35.5% from Asia. The top ﬁve
countries were United States (20%), Pakistan (14%), India
(7%), Brazil (7%), and Philippines (6%). Thus, we have
users from a diverse set of geographic locations.
Next, we examine the age of users. Our users ranged
between 18 and 65 and older, with the median age being 29;
this distribution is in-line with the overall U.S. Facebook
population [41]. Only 1.2% of users did not specify their
gender and for the rest, we observed a strong male bias with
76% of our users being male; this diﬀers from the overall
U.S. Facebook breakdown of 47% male [41]. Finally, for
the education level (reported by 73.8% of users), 67.8% of
users have been to college, while 5.9% of them have been
to graduate school. All these statistics demonstrate that we
have a diverse set of users in our dataset.
As our users are recruited from a social network, one addi-
tional concern is that the users might be a“close-knit”group
of friends (in terms of friendship), and not a more general
sample of the user population. To evaluate whether this is
the case, we check how closely related our users are by ex-
amining the number of users who are friends on Facebook,
and the number of user pairs with at least one common
friend. Out of the 678,030 possible pairs of users [
￿1,165
2
￿
],
44 (0.01%) were direct friends and 1,266 (0.19%) were not
direct friends but had at least one friend in common. Thus,
while our population does show some correlation with the
social network (unsurprising, given the viral spreading we
observed before), the user population is not strongly biased
towards one small region of the entire Facebook social net-
work.
Finally, we examine the activity of users in terms of up-
loaded content. Overall, our 1,165 users have an average
of 518 friends (median 332), and uploaded on average 1,040
pieces of content (median 506). 1,003 (84%) users have up-
loaded more than 100 pieces of content. Only 39 (3.3%)
users have uploaded fewer than 10 pieces of content while 3
(0.2%) of them have uploaded none. When we look at activ-
ity of users over time, we observe that the activities of our
users spanned over 8 years from 2005 to 2013. We further
ﬁnd that 90% of users have been active for more than 20%
of weeks since they joined Facebook. Our analysis of users
suggests that we have a fairly diverse population most of
whom are actively uploading content on Facebook.
4. SACL USAGE
We begin by examining the usage of SACLs by OSN users.
Speciﬁcally, we investigate how often and for what types of
content users specify SACLs.
1. How widely are SACLs used? We ﬁrst examine how
often diﬀerent users share content with SACLs, using the
FLM user set described in the previous section. Figure 1(a)
presents the cumulative distribution (CDF) of the number
of content shared using SACLs per user. We observe that
a majority of our users are using SACLs for content shar-
ing: 790 (67.8%) users out of 1,165 shared at least one piece
of content using a SACL. In total, these 790 users uploaded
212,753 pieces of content using SACLs; this content accounts
for 17.6% of all content uploaded by all 1,165 users. In the
remainder of the paper, we focus only on these 790 users and
the content they uploaded using SACLs. We note that the
fraction of users using SACLs in our dataset is comparable
to that reported for Google+ [31], where 74.8% of the users
used SACLs. However, these Google+ users shared signif-
icantly more (67.8%) of their content with SACLs. This
diﬀerence in the percentage of shared contents in Facebook
and Google+ is likely due to the diﬀerences in user interface
between the platforms. We leave a full exploration of the
comparative use of SACLs across online social networks to
future work.
Next, we observe that users use SACLs to diﬀerent ex-
tents. In particular, we examine the percentage of content
that each user shares with SACLs in Figure 1(b) (i.e., for
each user, what fraction of their content is shared with a
SACL?). We observe a biased distribution across users, but
a signiﬁcant fraction of users select SACLs for much of their
5Total Number Percent
Content type content shared with shared with
items SACLs SACLs
Status 786,800 139,112 17.7%
Photo 264,714 45,308 17.1%
Video 111,676 20,880 18.7%
Album 26,527 4,415 16.6%
SWF 9,794 1,554 15.9%
Note 8,500 883 10.4%
Checkin 3,224 548 17.0%
Question 374 25 6.7%
Music 355 27 7.6%
Oﬀer 9 1 11.1%
Total 1,211,973 212,753 17.6%
Table 1: Distribution of the number and percentage
of content shared with SACLs across diﬀerent types
of content.
content: 20% of users share more than 30% of all their con-
tent using SACLs.
Thus, we observe that SACLs are widely used by our users
for sharing content, which encourages us to further explore
the composition of SACLs and complexity of SACL speciﬁ-
cation in the following sections.
2. How many SACLs do users need to create? Hav-
ing observed that SACLs are widely used, we now investigate
how many diﬀerent SACLs users create from amongst their
friends. Figure 1(c) shows the cumulative distribution of
the number of unique SACLs speciﬁed by each user. A large
fraction (75%) of the users use less than 10 SACLs, and 20%
of the users use only a single SACL. However, there are 5
heavy SACL users, who have used more than 100 unique
SACLs. We ﬁnd that these are heavy users of privacy set-
tings and use diﬀerent combination of a small number of lists
and a set of handpicked friends to specify multiple SACLs
for multiple pieces of content. Overall, most users only re-
quire a limited number of SACLs to share sensitive content;
we leverage this ﬁnding later in Section 6 to reduce the user
overhead in specifying SACLs.
3. Does SACL usage vary with content types? Face-
book allows users to upload a variety of content types. Ta-
ble 1 presents a breakdown of the total number of content
items of diﬀerent types, and the fraction of those items
shared with SACLs. We are interested in understanding if
users are biased towards a few types of content when using
SACLs. The third and fourth columns of Table 1 show the
number and fraction of each type of content shared using
SACLs. We observe that SACLs are used across all nine dif-
ferent types of content. In fact, 10-20% of almost all types
of content are shared with SACLs. Questions and music
are shared least often with SACLs; we suspect that these
types of content tend to be more public and are usually not
privacy sensitive. This widespread use of SACLs across all
types of content further justiﬁes looking deeper into SACL
membership and complexity, with the goal of increasing the
usability of SACLs.
4. How are SACLs created? Facebook users can con-
struct their SACLs in diﬀerent ways. As mentioned in Sec-
tion 2.1, while creating a SACL the user may allow or deny
access to individual friends, or lists, or use a combination of
friends and lists. Table 2 shows the distribution of number
SACL created using
only only both lists
lists friends and friends
Number of Users 593 555 213
Percent of users
using SACLs 75.9% 71.1% 27.3%
Percent of SACLs 33.5% 44.3% 22.2%
Percent of content
shared with SACLs 61.4% 27% 11.6%
Table 2: Distribution of the number of users using
diﬀerent mechanisms to create SACLs while sharing
contents.
of users using diﬀerent mechanisms to create SACLs. We
observe that more than 70% of users are creating at least
one SACL by individually selecting their friends and more
than 44% of SACLs fall in this category; this is surpris-
ing, as selecting friends individually is a somewhat tedious
task. Interestingly, only 27% of SACL content is shared with
such SACLs; users share the majority of their content with
SACLs created using lists.
5. How many users are in SACLs? Next, we examine
the size of SACLs (i.e., how many of a user’s friends are
in diﬀerent SACLs). Figure 2 presents a CDF of fraction
of the SACL owner’s friends that the SACLs contain. We
observe that the distribution exhibits three distinct regions,
described below:
1. Include only few friends: The ﬁrst region is high-
lighted in gray on the left side of the graph; this region
contains SACLs with between 0% and 5% of the user’s
friends. This region contains 25% of all SACLs. In the
remainder of the paper, we refer to these as include
few SACLs.
2. Exclude only few friends: The next region is high-
lighted in gray on the right side of the graph; this
region contains SACLs with between 95% and 100%
of the user’s friends. This region contains 26% of all
SACLs. In the remainder of the paper, we refer to
these as exclude few SACLs.
3. Include subset of friends: The ﬁnal region is in the
middle of the graph; this region contains between 5%
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Figure 2: Percentage of friends included in SACLs.
SACLs in the left gray region are the include few
SACLs, SACLs in the right gray region are exclude
few SACLs, and the SACLs in middle white region
are the include subset SACLs.
6and 95% of the user’s friends. This region contains the
plurality (49%) of the SACLs. In the remainder of the
paper, we refer to these as include subset SACLs.
As we suggest below, the distribution of SACL sizes is very
likely inﬂuenced by the interface for SACL speciﬁcation. We
use our categorization in the rest of the chapter when we try
to characterize the SACL members across diﬀerent features.
However, for exclude few SACLs we also want to see whether
we can characterize the excluded friends; for these, we also
examine the excluded members of exclude few SACLs. The
plurality of include subset SACLs shows that our users are
not simply including or excluding a handful of their friends,
but are often including large subsets of their friends. This
result further motivates the need to understand how these
subsets are selected.
Overall, our observations suggest SACLs are being widely
used today by a majority of our users to control access to a
non-trivial fraction of their content. SACLs are used at dif-
ferent rates by diﬀerent users, but they do appear to be used
to share many diﬀerent types of content. Finally, SACLs
show wildly diﬀerent sizes, with many SACLs containing
few or almost all of a user’s friends. With this understand-
ing, we turn to examine the membership of SACLs in the
following section.
5. SACL MEMBERSHIP
We now take a closer look at the membership of SACLs.
In other words, are the members of a given SACL distin-
guishable from the SACL creator’s other friends? (e.g., do
the members share a proﬁle attribute?) This question is in-
teresting to examine, as any automatic detection of SACL
membership would only work if the SACL members were
distinguishable. Moreover, existing work [16,39,48] hypoth-
esizes that proﬁle attributes, network structure, and user
activity can help us to automatically detect clusters corre-
sponding to SACLs; we aim to see if this is true using our
dataset of real-world ﬁne-grained privacy settings.
5.1 Methodology
Our analysis in this section explores the possibility of char-
acterizing SACL members as a group across three features:
(i) proﬁle attributes, (ii) social network structure, and (iii)
activity. In other words, we would like to see whether the
SACL members form a distinct cluster among the friends of
the user. To do so, we form clusters based on these three
features and then examine how closely the SACLs of the
user match our cluster (e.g., we form a cluster of all user’s
friends who attended the same high school and then look
to see if this cluster matches any SACL). To compare our
automatically detected clusters and the user’s SACLs, we
address three separate questions:
1. Do the automatically detected clusters match
SACLs? Once we have the clusters of friends for a given
feature, for each SACL, we try to ﬁnd the best matching
cluster. To compute the “goodness” of a match, we use the
F-score metric [37] which provides a measure of detection
accuracy. It is computed as the harmonic mean of precision
and recall; F-score varies from 0 to 1, with 1 representing a
perfect match.
Unfortunately, a low F-score does not necessarily imply
that SACLs are not correlated with automatically detected
groups. For example, the members of a SACL could be split
between two automatically detected groups; in this case, the
F-score for both groups would be quite low, but the F-score
of the union of the groups would be quite high. Looking
deeper into this issue takes us to our next question.
2. How distributed are the SACLs across clusters?
In order to check how widely the SACL members are spread
across the clusters we use the metric entropy [10]. For a
given SACL and a cluster c from a set of automatically de-
tected clusters C, we can compute p(c), the probability of a
SACL member belonging to c. Then we measure the entropy
of the SACL as
−
X
c∈C
p(c)log2 p(c)
A higher value of entropy signiﬁes more diversity within the
SACL members (i.e., they are spread across more clusters).
To be able to compare across the SACLs which belong to
diﬀerent users (with diﬀerent numbers of clusters and friends
per cluster), we normalize the entropy using maximum pos-
sible entropy per SACL. A SACL will have maximum en-
tropy when its members are uniformly distributed across all
clusters [10]; in this case the entropy will be log2 |C|, where
|C| is the number of clusters in C. We therefore calculate
normalized entropy as
−
P
c∈C p(c)log2 p(c)
log2 |C|
Normalized entropy for a SACL ranges from 0 to 1. A nor-
malized entropy close to 1 indicates that a SACL is uni-
formly spread across the maximum number of clusters and
a normalized entropy close to 0 indicates that all or most of
the SACL members are part of one cluster.
3. How are SACLs diﬀerent from random groups?
One outstanding issue remains: We are examining the en-
tropy of SACLs, but we would really like to measure what’s
the likelihood of selecting the members of a SACL by pure
chance. For example, suppose all of a user’s friends attended
the same high school; in this case, the “high school” cluster
(all friends in a single cluster) would perfectly match any
large SACL.
To measure the uniqueness of SACLs relative to ran-
dom groups, we use the Adjusted Rand Index (ARI) [43]
to determine the similarity between SACL and automati-
cally detected clusters. ARI is a similarity metric normal-
ized against chance and varies from -1 to 1. An ARI of 0
indicates no better similarity than a random group, a nega-
tive ARI implies worse similarity than a random group, and
an ARI of 1 indicates exact similarity. For each SACL, we
calculate at the ARI provided by the most similar cluster. If
most of the SACLs have ARI close to 0, then the automati-
cally detected clusters are no better in detecting the SACLs
than simply using random groups.
5.2 SACLs and user attributes
We ﬁrst explore whether SACL membership is correlated
with a common proﬁle attribute. To do so, we leverage
the proﬁle attributes provided by Facebook users, focusing
on four attributes: workplace, education, current city, and
family. We choose these attributes as they have been shown
be most strongly correlated with groupings of users in social
networks [40]. Using these attributes, we group the friends
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Figure 3: Correspondence between the attribute-based clusters and SACLs, with the cumulative distributions
of (a) F-score, (b) Normalized entropy, and (c) ARI. Figure 3(a) shows only 15% of the automatically
generated attribute-based communities have a F-score of more than 0.6, indicating low number of SACLs
showing high match. Figure 3(b) shows that larger SACLs are spread across multiple such clusters and have
higher normalized entropy. The reverse is true for include few SACLs and excluded members of exclude few
SACLs. However, Figure 3(c) conﬁrms that more than 40% of these SACLs show better similarity with
attribute-based clusters than random groups.
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Figure 4: Correspondence between the network communities and SACLs. Figure 4(a) shows 21% of network
communities have a F-score of more than 0.6, indicating a relatively poor match between network communities
and SACLs. Figure 4(b) and Figure 4(c) conﬁrms that though the larger SACLs have higher entropy (i.e.,
they are distributed across multiple communities), more than 90% of these SACLs show better similarity
with network-based clusters compare to random groups.
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Figure 5: Correspondence between the activity-based clusters and SACLs. Figure 5(a) shows 47% of the
automatic attribute clusters shows a F-score of more than 0.6, indicating comparatively strong match between
activity communities and SACLs. However, Figure 5(b) shows that the larger SACLs have higher entropy,
and Figure 5(c) shows that only 4% have ARI more than 0.3. As a result, random groupings of friends the
same size as SACLs would likely show a degree of similar matching.
8of a user into clusters who share a common attribute. We re-
port results for all attribute groups in aggregate for brevity;
the results are similar when considering each attribute type
alone.
We begin by using the F-score metric to check how many
of the SACLs exactly match the attribute-based clusters.
We present the cumulative distribution of F-scores across
all SACLs in Figure 3(a). The ﬁgure shows that only 15%
of all SACLs have a F-score of more than 0.6, indicating a
good match for a small subset of SACLs. The result is even
worse for very small SACLs (include few or the excluded
members of exclude few), with only 10% of such SACLs
having a F-score more than 0.6.
We explore the reason for the low F-scores by analyzing
the normalized entropy of these SACLs in Figure 3(b). The
ﬁgure shows that the small SACLs have a low entropy (with
20% of include few SACLs with entropy 0) indicating they
are mostly part of single attribute-based clusters (this is un-
surprising, given that these SACLs are small). On the other
hand, the larger SACLs show a high entropy with 35% of ex-
clude few SACLs having an entropy of more than 0.8. These
results suggest that our attribute clusters are overestimat-
ing the smaller SACLs (indicated by low entropy and low
F-score) and underestimating the larger SACLs (indicated
by high entropy and low F-score).
Finally, we examine whether SACLs match attribute clus-
ters better than random groups using ARI. As mentioned in
Section 5.1, an ARI of 0 indicates similarity no better than
random groups. Figure 3(c) presents the cumulative distri-
bution of ARI across all SACLs; we observe that 68% of all
SACLs have ARI larger than 0, indicating they have more
similarity with attribute-based clusters than a purely ran-
dom set of friends.
Overall, our results suggest that only a small number of at-
tribute clusters serve as a close match for SACLs. However,
the SACLs do show some correlation with attribute groups
when compared to random subsets of the user’s friends.
Next, we look into the correlation between SACLs and the
social network to see if network-based clusters more closely
approximate the SACLs.
5.3 SACLs and network structure
In order to explore whether the SACLs correspond to
the network structure, we ﬁrst identity clusters of the
user’s friends that are tightly connected in the social net-
work (these clusters are often called network communities).
Speciﬁcally, we extract all of the friendship connections be-
tween the user’s friends, and then use a community detection
algorithm that has been shown to work well in grouping a
user’s friends into a small set of clusters [35]. This algo-
rithm is a combination of a global community detection al-
gorithm [6] and a local community detection algorithm [40]
to detect overlapping communities.
5
We begin by examining how many of the SACLs exactly
match one of the social network-based clusters. Figure 4(a)
presents the cumulative distribution of F-scores across all
5We note that there are a large variety of community detec-
tion techniques in the literature. To make sure our choice
of algorithm did not bias the results of our analysis, we per-
formed the same analysis with two additional community
detection algorithms [9, 42] similar to ones used in earlier
work on unsupervised detection of privacy settings [16,39].
Our results were similar with these algorithms, and so we
omit the results for brevity.
SACLs. The ﬁgure shows that 21% of all SACLs have a F-
score of more than 0.6, indicating a good match for 21% of
SACLs. This is signiﬁcantly higher than the attribute-based
clusters in the prior section, but still does not show a strong
correlation.
We next analyze the normalized entropy of these SACLs in
Figure 4(b). Similar to the attribute-based clusters, the net-
work communities tend to overestimate smaller SACLs and
underestimate larger SACLs, but at a much lower rate. We
verify these ﬁndings using ARI in Figure 4(c). We can ob-
serve that 98% of all SACLs have ARI more than 0, indicat-
ing almost all of the SACLs have more similarity with com-
munity based clusters than a purely random set of friends.
Overall, the network communities show better match with
SACLs compared to the attribute clusters. However, still
only a small fraction of SACLs have strong correlation with
network communities, making it unlikely that network com-
munications could be used to infer SACLs for sharing con-
tent. Next we will look into the correlation between activity-
based clusters and SACLs.
5.4 SACLs and user activity
For our ﬁnal user feature, we examine whether the member-
ship of SACLs is correlated with the strength of the link
between the user and their friends. As a proxy for link
strength, we use activity; this is a common way to estimate
how closely connected two users are [3]. For each user, we
collected data about four diﬀerent types of interaction be-
tween the user and their friends: (i) posting on the user’s
wall, (ii) liking the user’s posts, (iii) commenting on the
user’s posts, and (iv) being tagged in the user’s status and
photos. We observe that 94% of the users who used SACLs
have at least one such interaction with their friends.
Using this data, we cluster each user’s friends by activity
(i.e., frequency of interaction) and see whether the activity-
based clusters matched the SACLs. We use the same algo-
rithm as prior work [3] to ﬁnd the activity clusters. The
algorithm is essentially a k-means algorithm modiﬁed to au-
tomatically ﬁnd the optimal number of clusters. As a result,
all friends with a similar number of interactions will be put
in one cluster. After running the algorithm, we ﬁnd that the
median number of clusters across all users is four.
6
As before, we begin by examining the cumulative distri-
bution of the F-score in Figure 5(a); we observe that 47% all
SACLs have a F-score of greater than 0.6. This is even better
than network-based communities. The larger SACLs (e.g.,
exclude few SACLs) show an even stronger match with high
F-scores, but the match is considerably worse for smaller
SACLs (e.g., include few SACLs), with only 3% of such
SACLs having a F-score more than 0.6. Closely examining
the activity-based clusters, we hypothesize that our method
of creating activity communities often results in creating a
large cluster containing all friends with low levels of interac-
tion with the user. As a result, this single, large community
alone overlaps with the large SACLs considerably, making
their F-score quite high.
To conﬁrm this hypothesis, we also calculate the cumu-
lative distribution of normalized entropy (Figure 5(b)) and
ARI (Figure 5(c)). We ﬁnd a poor match between SACLs
6Interestingly, this observation matches Dunbar’s sociologi-
cal study [12,28] where the number of Dunbar’s circles, the
number of activity-based clusters in people’s oﬄine network
is also four.
9Figure 6: Facebook’s interface for specifying SACLs.
and activity-based clusters using both pieces of analysis; the
ARI values for the SACLs are very close to 0 for almost
all activity-based clusters (e.g., only 8% of the SACLs have
ARI more than 0.3). This ﬁnding conﬁrms that any ran-
dom groups of the size of larger SACLs will show the same
level of similarity with the activity-based clusters, thus mak-
ing the clusters a poor mechanism for approximating SACL
membership.
5.5 Summary
In this section, we examined the membership of SACLs by
trying to correlate SACL members with attribute, network
structure, and activity-based clusters. Our results show
that very few of these clusters show a signiﬁcant correla-
tion with SACLs, suggesting that automatically detected
SACLs-based on these features are unlikely to be very accu-
rate. This ﬁnding is in opposition to the results from prior
work [16,39,48], which suggest that it is possible to use au-
tomatically detected clusters to create SACLs. We believe
this diﬀerence is due to the fact that these prior works were
not able to evaluate their proposals against ground-truth
SACLs. In fact, others have also found [33] that users are
able to group their friends in meaningful groups, but ﬁnd
it diﬃcult to choose the right group to share content with.
Consequently, we explore alternative approaches to increase
the usability of SACLs in the next section.
6. SACL SPECIFICATION
We have observed that SACLs appear to be quite diﬃcult to
infer automatically. We now examine the “overhead” (i.e.,
the amount of work that users must perform) in order to
specify SACLs today. Then, we explore how we can increase
the usability of these SACLs by reducing the user overhead
and making SACLs easier to use. If successful, these ap-
proaches would make privacy easier for users to manage,
thereby increasing the usability of OSNs in general.
6.1 SACL speciﬁcation overhead
The act of specifying a SACL—choosing which friends to
share content with—induces cognitive overhead on the user.
While there may be multiple dimensions of this overhead
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Figure 7: Cumulative distribution of overhead for
specifying SACLs. Shown are the distributions of
measured SACLs (Original), measured SACLs tak-
ing into account Facebook’s last-used setting (Last-
used setting), the optimal overhead for measured
SACLs (Optimal), and the overhead of our proposed
mechanism of presenting the user with the last 5
SACLs (Past history). Our proposed mechanism
shows a substantial reduction in user overhead.
(e.g., deciding whether to include a speciﬁc user, using the
interface, etc), many of these are quite challenging to mea-
sure. As a ﬁrst step, we deﬁne the SACL speciﬁcation over-
head to be the number of terms used to specify a SACL.
Our reasons for doing so is that Facebook allows users to
specify SACLs using an allow/deny interface, where users
can select friends or lists to allow or deny access (a screen-
shot of Facebook’s interface is shown in Figure 6). Thus,
the amount of work the user has to do is proportional to
the number of friends/lists that the user selects to allow or
deny. Of course, we recognize there are dimensions of over-
head that this measure fails to capture; we leave the task of
characterizing those dimensions of user overhead to future
work.
As an example, consider the screenshot shown in Figure 6.
In this example, the user is choosing to allow friends Bob,
Carol, the list Football Friends, and the Facebook list Fam-
ily. The user is also choosing to deny the list Drinking Bud-
dies. As a result, the SACL speciﬁcation overhead for this
SACL is ﬁve (A total of ﬁve terms appear in the allow and
deny settings.) It is important to note that the size of the
SACL is diﬀerent from its speciﬁcation overhead: Consider
the case of a user only denying access to a single friend. In
this case, the speciﬁcation overhead is low, but the SACL
has many users in it.
We deﬁne the average user overhead as the average of
all SACL speciﬁcation overheads for content shared by a
given user. Formally, if a user speciﬁes access to her content
{c1,c2,...cn} with privacy settings {p1,p2,...pn}, the average
user overhead for this user is
P
i |pi|
n
where |pi| denotes the SACL speciﬁcation overhead of set-
ting pi. Note that the pi settings are not necessarily distinct,
as multiple pieces of content may be shared with the same
SACL. The best-possible average user overhead is 1, mean-
ing the user only used the SACLs with a single term when
sharing her content.
We present cumulative distribution of the average user
overhead in Figure 7 with the line “Original”. We ob-
10serve that users do have signiﬁcant overhead when speci-
fying SACLs: 86% of users have an overhead more than 1,
and there are more than 150 users with overhead more than
5. This suggests there is signiﬁcant potential to reduce the
SACL speciﬁcation overhead for users, making SACLs more
usable.
6.2 Last-used setting
Facebook’s default privacy setting for content is set to select
the last-used privacy setting [20]. So, if a user selects a SACL
for a newly uploaded piece of content, all future pieces of
content will be shared with the same SACL until the user
chooses a diﬀerent privacy setting. We therefore modify our
deﬁnition of average user overhead to capture this behavior;
if a user selects the same SACL as the previous piece of
content, we deﬁne this SACL speciﬁcation overhead to be 0.
As a result, a user’s average user overhead may be less than
one.
We present the cumulative distribution of the average user
overhead, taking into account the last-used setting, in Fig-
ure 7 with the line “Last-used setting”. We immediately
observe a signiﬁcant reduction in the measured overhead,
which we believe more accurately captures the work a user
must do. The ﬁgure shows that this simple technique of us-
ing last setting as the default can signiﬁcantly reduce the
user overhead: this technique lowers the overhead by more
than 50% for almost half (48%) of the users. Thus, Face-
book’s choice to enable default last-used settings is useful
in reducing user overhead. For the remainder of our anal-
ysis, we use average user overhead, taking into account the
last-used setting, as our baseline.
6.3 Optimal overhead
It is important to note that there may be multiple ways of
specifying a given SACL: For example, a user could specify
the SACL by only allowing the friends in the SACL. Or,
the user could use an existing list, and exclude the users
not allowed to access the content. Or, the user could allow
all friends, and then deny only the friends who should not
be able to access the content. We now examine how close
the user’s chosen speciﬁcations are to the optimal speciﬁca-
tion, in terms of the SACL speciﬁcation with the minimum
overhead.
To do so, for each SACL we observe, we determine the
optimal speciﬁcation overhead.
7 We then present the cumu-
lative distribution of average user overhead in the optimal
case in Figure 7 with the line“Optimal setting”. We observe
that there is still room for improvement from using the last-
used setting alone; many users could express their SACLs in
a manner than involves fewer terms.
6.4 Using past history
In this section, we explore a generalization of the last-used
setting, with the goal of further reducing the average user
overhead. The results in Section 4 suggested that there are
certain SACLs that users select to share content with a sig-
niﬁcant fraction of the time. Figure 8 plots the cumulative
7Note that computing the optimal overhead of a setting is a
modiﬁed version of the NP-hard set cover problem [32] where
the setting is the universe and lists and individual friends are
subsets of the universe. We use a brute force solution to the
problem, which is feasible due to small number of subsets in
this case.
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.8  1
F
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
u
s
e
r
s
(
C
D
F
)
% contents shared with SACLs covered
top 1 SACL
top 5 SACLs
top 10 SACLs
Figure 8: Cumulative distribution of percentage of
content covered by the top k SACLs. Even if we set
k=5, most of the content for the majority of users
are covered.
distribution of the percentage of content shared with the
top k most frequently used SACLs for each user. For exam-
ple we can see that if we allow each user to use their top
5 SACLs, this would cover over 80% of the content for the
vast majority (90%) of users.
This observation means that we may be able to signiﬁ-
cantly reduce the average user overhead by allowing users
to choose from their k most used SACLs, rather than just
the last-used SACL. To do so, we calculate the average user
overhead, assuming one would have made it possible for the
user to directly use the top 5 most frequently used settings
while sharing content (Should the user re-use these settings,
we calculate the overhead as 0). A cumulative distribution
of the resulting overhead is shown in Figure 7 with the line
“Past history”. We immediately observe a dramatic reduc-
tion in user overhead (In fact, the overhead is lowered for
86% of users).
In summary, this approach of leveraging past history
has the potential to signiﬁcantly reduce the user overhead
in specifying SACLs. An OSN operator can create these
SACLs based on user’s past history, and provide them as
options to select from, when the user uploads a new piece
of content. Should the user select one of the previously-
used SACLs, it will reduce their overhead and make privacy
speciﬁcation more usable.
7. CONCLUDING DISCUSSION
Online social networks are increasingly popular and users
are sharing ever more content on these services. In this pa-
per, we focused on the most privacy-sensitive of these con-
tent: the content with hand-crafted privacy settings selected
by the users. We found that these SACLs are surprisingly
common (over 17.6% of all content is shared with SACLs),
but that the membership of these SACLs shows relatively
little correlation with the proﬁle attributes, the social net-
work structure, or the activity level of the members. As a
result, there appears to be little hope of automatically de-
tecting more than a few of these SACLs. We also found that
the act of specifying SACLs is often complicated for users,
but a simple technique like remembering a few of the most
frequently used SACLs is likely to signiﬁcantly reduce this
burden in practice.
However, much work remains to be done. In the remainder
of this section, we discuss a few of the limitations of our
study, as well as future directions for exploration.
11Understanding motivation for SACLs Our study ex-
plores the use of SACLs, but does not reveal why users create
SACLs or how they choose the content to share with SACLs.
Possible reasons include dissatisfaction with the default pri-
vacy settings, the sharing of highly privacy sensitive content,
or using SACLs as a mechanism to choose the audience for
a particular content.
Moving target We quantiﬁed the way users create in-use
SACLs today, but Facebook is known for changing their pri-
vacy interface over time [18]; these changes are likely to im-
pact the usage of SACLs for individual users. We aim to
repeat our analysis as Facebook makes these changes, hop-
ing to capture resulting changes in user behavior.
SACL accuracy It remains an unexplored question as to
which of the friends users would ideally want to share their
content with (i.e., who does the user want to be in a SACL,
regardless of who is actually in the SACL). Prior work has
shown that users often misunderstand other Facebook pri-
vacy settings [34], and we suspect that this would likely hold
true for SACLs as well.
SACL overhead In our calculation of overhead, we took
into consideration the number of terms speciﬁed by users
explicitly while specifying SACLs, where a term can be a
friend list or an individual friend. However, this quantiﬁca-
tion does not directly account for the mental eﬀort required
for a user when creating SACLs (e.g., certain SACLs may
be easier or harder to create, even if they have the same
number of terms). We leave a full exploration of this eﬀect
(possibly via detailed debrieﬁng interviews of a small sample
of Facebook users) to future work.
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